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COMMENTS
THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT-AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT
DECISIONs-"This is the Supreme Court of Michigan speaking,
the possessor of all the historic powers of law and equity, the
keeper of the conscience of our sovereign people, a constitutional
court of plenary powers, not a legislative court of enfeebled and
circumscribed jurisdiction." 1 These words of Justice Talbot
Smith seem to epitomize the attitude of the present majority
toward the role of the Michigan Supreme Court as a court of last
resort. It is the purpose of this comment to attempt to determine
and evaluate just what the court's role has been. Attention will be
directed to selected areas of non-statutory and statutory law, with
specific emphasis placed upon the areas of contributory negligence and workmen's compensation.

I. Introduction
The eight-man Michigan Supreme Court currently consists
of Chief Justice Dethmers and Associate Justices Carr, Kelly,
Smith, Black, Edwards, Voelker and Kavanagh. Justices Smith,
Black, Edwards and Voelker were named to the court between
1954 and 1957 and at that time joined together in several fourfour decisions, which automatically affirm the trial court.2 In 1958
this deadlock was broken when Justice Kavanagh became a member of the court and joined forces with the four newer justices.
The effect of these personnel changes becomes apparent by studying the history of two recent automobile accident cases.3 In both
cases the trial judge gave judgment for defendant n.o.v. because
plaintiff had been guilty of contributory negligence. In 1957
both judgments were affirmed four-four. In 1958 both judgments
were reversed on rehearing, five-three. Justice Kelly, dissenting in
one of the cases, pointed out that there had been no change in
the facts or the law, only in personnel. Justice Voelker, however,

1 Consumers Power Co. v. Muskegon County, 346 Mich. 243 at 265, 78 N.W. (2d) 223
(1956).
2 See, e.g., notes 3 and 4 infra:
3 Weller v. Mancha, 351 Mich. 50, 87 N.W. (2d) 134 (1957); rehearing, 353 Mich. 189,
91 N.W. (2d) 352 (1958); Steger v. Blanchard, 350 Mich. 579, 86 N.W. (2d) 796 (1957):'
r~hearing, 353 Mich. 140, 90 N.W. (2d) 891 (1958).
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found "one other change," a change "in how a majority of this
Court views the law." 4
II. Non-Statutory Law-Torts
A. Generally. If there is a single theme which might be found
running through the cases decided in this area it is this: the present majority has indicated a strong tendency to remove obstacles
to recovery. It has taken a broad approach toward restitution,5
cast doubt upon a municipality's immunity from suit,6 adopted a
rule akin to res ipsa loquitur, 7 indicated liberality toward the
problem of psychic injuries, 8 and favored a strict attitude toward
imputed negligence.9 All this has been done to some extent in
derogation of previous Michigan case law. Perhaps most significant has been the court's approach to the duty problem in the law
of torts. Justice Smith has gone beyond existing authority in at
least two areas. In a dissenting opinion in 1956 he stated that
there is a duty on the part of a creditor not to write his debtor's
employer in order to coerce payment.10 In 1958 he wrote a majority opinion stating broadly that a landowner owes a duty of care
to a trespassing child. 11
A recent opinion of Justice Voelker also illustrates this
point.12 The action was for breach of warranty in the sale of
4 Steger v. Blanchard, 353 Mich. 140 at 141-142, 90 N.W. (2d) 891 (1958). For another
4-4 opinion in 1957, see Wall v. Lunn Laminates, 350 Mich. 626, 86 N.W. (2d) 804 (1957).
No rehearing was applied for here apparently because Justices Smith, Black, Edwards
and Voelker agreed with the trial judge.
Ii Consumers Power Co. v. Muskegon County, 346 Mich. 243, 78 N.W. (2d) 223 (1956);
Janiszewski v. Behrmann, 345 Mich. 8, 75 N.W. (2d) 77 (1956), dissenting opinions of
Justice Smith.
6 Richards v. Birmingham School District, 348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W. (2d) 643 (1957),
dissenting opinion of Justice Edwards joined by Justice Smith. Justice Black concurred
specially and refrained from discussing the issue.
7 Higdon v. Carlebach, 348 Mich. 363, 83 N.W. (2d) 296 (1957).
8 Courtney v. Apple, 345 Mich. 223, 76 N.W. (2d) 80 (1956). Cf. Lahar v. Barnes, 353
Mich. 408, 91 N.W. (2d) 261 (1958).
9 Sherman v. Korff, 353 Mich. 387, 91 N.W. (2d) 485 (1958).
10 "But when one of our people buys a refrigerator on time, he does not thereupon
hang the vestments of his privacy in his creditor's closet, to stand naked and exposed to
whatever measures the creditor chooses to employ to collect the debt." Hawley v. Profes•
sional Credit Bureau, 345 Mich. 500 at 516, 76. N.W. (2d) 835 (1956).
11 " ••• [T]he fact that the child is a trespasser does not now relieve the owner of the
duty to use reasonable care..•." Lyshak v. Detroit, 351 Mich. 230 at 248, 88 N.W. (2d)
596 (1958). This could be considered dictum because the defendant conducted a dangerous
activity (golfing) after the plaintiff had been discovered. This is the ground upon which
Chief Justice Dethmers concurred, joined by Justices Carr and Kelly. Justice Edwards
concurred solely on the basis of tlle quoted language.
12 Spence v. Three Rivers Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W. (2d) 873 (1958).
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chattels. The plaintiff's independent contractor had purchased
building blocks from defendant. The trial court denied relief
because there was no privity of contract between plaintiff and
defendant. This was reversed on appeal, five-three. Justice Kelly,
writing for the dissent, followed the traditional analysis: (1) the
action is for breach of warranty; (2) there was no privity; (3)
therefore the plaintiff must lose.13 Justice Voelker's majority
opinion is less easy to summarize. He began by referring to the
implied warranty of "merchantability"14 although the facts, the
statute15 cited, and later language indicate that the implied warranty of fitness for purpose was intended. He next expressed an
inability to understand why privity should be an element of an
action on a warranty yet not of a negligence action. 16 He then discussed the exception to the privity requirement but found no
reason why it should be limited to dangerous articles or food
causing personal injury. 17 Throughout his opinion the requirement of privity was criticized. Against this must be balanced Justice Voelker's reading of the complaint as stating a cause of action in negligence. 18
B. Contributory Negligence. This aspect of the law of negligence occupies a unique position in the common law of any jurisdiction. Almost completely judge-made law it is readily susceptible to judicial change. Because of its almost daily application
and its intimate relation to the problems of ordinary people it is
sensitive to social, political and economic influences. Because of
the accidental nature of the situations to which it is applied there
is but slim possibility of reliance on the doctrine by the people it
affects. It is not surprising that this area of the law should occasion
more frequent expression of judicial notions of public policy
than others.
If the doctrine of contributory negligence itself was not such a
device,19 the particular formulations of contributory negligence
which grew up thereunder as a matter of law were conveniently

ls Id. at 135 et seq.
14 Id. at 122.
15 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §440.15(2).
16 Spence v. Three Rivers Supply, 353 Mich. 120 at
17 Id. at 130.
18 Ibid. But cf. id. at 135.
19 See Malone, "The Formative Era of Contributory

151 at 158 (1946).

129, 90 N.W. (2d) 873 (1958).
Negligence," 41 ILL. L. REv.
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adaptable to judicial control of plaintiff-minded juries.2 ° Characteristic of these formulations was the Michigan rule relative to
pedestrians crossing a street:
"Under present-day traffic conditions a pedestrian, before
crossing a street or highway, must (I) make proper observation as to approaching traffic, (2) observe approaching traffic and form a judgment as to its distance away and its speed,
(3) continue his observation while crossing the street or
highway, and (4) exercise that degree of care and caution
which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under like circumstances."21
Similar formulae arose in a variety of other situations especially
in the auto accident field. 22 Thus a doctrine, conceived as a means
of allowing judges freedom to decide cases in accordance with the
flexible standard of due care, imposed upon its creators the
shackles of precedent.23 When a case fitted any pre-determined
pigeonhole the decision would not only be out of the control of
the jury, it would be out of the control of the judges as well. The
original members of the present majority swiftly recorded their
dissatisfaction with this condition of Michigan law.24 When the
crusading minority became a deciding majority, a new doctrine
arose: the issue of contributory negligence is now to be left for
the jury in all cases in which reasonable men might differ; rarely
is a case to be taken from the jury.25 In making this change the
majority relied on the following:
(I) A passage from a decision by Judge Cooley26 emphasizing the province of the jury in determining questions
of fact upon which reasonable minds might differ. 27 Thus
the majority has been able to point out that although it has
changed the law, it has done so only in the light of preexisting principles.28
20 See Turk, "Comparative Negligence on the March," 28 Cm-KENT L. REv. 189
(1950); Malone, "Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases," 29 MINN. L. REv.
61 at 66 (1945).
21 Malone v. Vining, 313 Mich. 315 at 321, 21 N.W. (2d) 144 (1946).
22 See JAMIESON AND BROWN, MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE LAw, 2d ed. (1951).
23 See McKinney v. Yelavich, 352 Mich. 687 at 691, 90 N.W. (2d) 883 (1958); 1954
Wis. L. REv. 95 at 139 et seq.
2i Sun Oil Co. v. Seamon, 349 Mich. 387, 84 N.W. (2d) 840 (1957).
25 Van Gilder v. C. &: E. Trucking Corp., 352 Mich. 672, 90 N.W. (2d) 828 (1958).
26 Detroit&: M.R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99 at 123 (1868).
27 Gilson v. Bronkhorst, 353 Mich. 148, 90 N.W. (2d) 701 (1958); Cole v. Barber, 353
Mich. 427, 91 N.W. (2d) 848 (1958).
28 Shaw v. Bashore, 353 Mich. 31, 90 N.W. (2d) 688 (1958).
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(2) The traditional rule that on appeal of a directed verdict for defendant or a judgment for defendant n.o.v., the
evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.29 By emphasizing this the majority has substantially
weakened the contervailing notion that undisputed physical
facts overcome the rule. 30
·
(3) The assertion that the plaintiff's actions must not be
viewed as isolated conduct but rather in the framework of
the total situation, including the defendant's negligence; 31
due care by plaintiff does not include the duty to foresee or
anticipate the negligent or illegal acts of the defendant.32
(4) A belief that substantial changes in traffic conditions
invalidate the earlier approach. 33
Closely related to the retreat from the doctrine of contributory negligence as a matter of law is the unanimously adopted
court rule shifting the burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence from the plaintiff to the defendant. 34 This shift
creates a doubtful future for the presumption of due care accorded a deceased party to an accident35 as it relates to a plaintiff's
decedent.36
At one time this shifting of the Michigan position appeared
destined to become a radical departure from traditional notions,
but the more recent decisions indicate that the outcome will be
much more moderate than the heralds had portended. Such results should not, however, overshadow the fact that Michigan
law on this subject has substantially changed. The effect of a jury
determination of the ultimate issue -of contributory negligence
with the burden of proof on the defendant should undoubtedly
produce more plaintiffs' victories.
Hoffman v. Burkhead, 353 Mich. 47, 90 N.W. (2d) 498 (1958).
so Shaw v. Bashore, 353 Mich. 31, 90 N.W. (2d) 688 (1958). But see Van Gilder v.
C. & E. Trucking Corp., 352 Mich. 672 at 684, 90 N.W. (2d) 828 (1958).
31 Compare Ware v. Nelson, 351 Mich. 390, 88 N.W. (2d) 524 (1958), with Jones v.
Michigan Racing Assn., 346 Mich. 648, 78 N.W. (2d) 566 (1956).
32 Samyn v. Bublitz, 352 Mich. 613, 90 N.W. (2d) 711 (1958); Vandervelt v. Mather,
353 Mich. 1, 90 N.W. (2d) 894 (1958). But see Landon v. Shepherd, 353 Mich. 500 at
507, 91 N.W. (2d) 844 (1958).
33 Krause v. Ryan, 344 Mich. 428 at 439, 74 N.W. (2d) 20 (1955) (dissent); Bartlett
v. Melzo, 351 Mich. 177 at 181, 88 N.W. (2d) 518 (1958); McKinney v. Yelavich, 352 Mich,
687 at 690 et seq., 90 N.W. (2d) 883 (1958).
·
34 Mich. Court Rule 23, §3a, adopted April 14, 1958, effective June 1, 1958. Reported
352 Mich. p. xiii (1958).
35 Shaw v. Bashore, 353 Mich. 31, 90 N .W. (2d) 688 (1958);, Steger v. Blanchard,: 353
Mich. 140, 90 N.W. (2d) 891 (1958).
·
36 GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE AqnONS 50 (1936).
. ..
20
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III. Statutory Law
A. Generally. Neither the present majority nor the minority
has developed a sophisticated technique for interpreting statutes,
although the majority is perhaps more likely to appeal to broad
sociological considerations37 or a presumption that the legislature
intended a "just" result. 38 Both groups have placed heavy reliance
upon decisions from other states without establishing any connection between those decisions and the intent of the Michigan
legislature.30 On occasion the present majority has devoted considerable space to a review of the legal history surrounding the
statute in question, with largely inconclusive results. 40 At other
times it has adopted a literal approach41 and ignored highly persuasive legislative history. 42
One area in which some definitive pattern of the court's approach to problems of statutory interpretation has developed
concerns cases involving statutes which have been previously interpreted or amended. Four situations need to be considered.
(1) The legislature enacts a statute, the court interprets it and the
legislature leaves the statute untouched. In this situation it has
been stated that the legislature did not by silence adopt the court's
interpretation. The question concerns only the propriety of the
initial interpretation.43 (2) The legislature enacts a statute, the
court interprets it and subsequently the statute is re-enacted
without change. In this situation it has been stated that the legis-

87 See Pazan v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 343 Mich. 587 at 592, 73
N.W. (2d) 327 (1955) (dissent); Powell v. Employment Security Commission, 345 Mich.
455, 75 N.W. (2d) 874 (1956). But see In re Smith's Estate, 343 Mich. 291, 72 N.W. (2d)
287 (1955).
38 See Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co., 350 Mich. 135, 85 N.W. (2d) 97 (1957). The
present minority has used the same reasoning. MacDonald v. Quimby, 350 Mich. 21, 85
N.W. (2d) 157 (1957).
39 See, e.g., Butterfield Theaters v. Revenue Dept., 353 Mich. 345, 91 N.W. (2d) 269
(1958).
40 Moore v. Palmer, 350 Mich. 363, 86 N.W. (2d) 585 (1957), followed in Kiefer v.
Gosso, 353 Mich. 19, 90 N.W. (2d) 844 (1958).
41 E.g., Kroes v. Harryman, 352 Mich. 642, 90 N.W. (2d) 444 (1958).
42 See dissenting opinion of Justice Carr in Dyer v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 350 Mich.
92 at 100-102, 85 N.W. (2d) 152 (1957).
43 Van Dorpel v. Haven-Busch Co., 350 Mich. 135, 85 N.W. (2d) 97 (1957). Justice
Voelker pointed out that the court which had originally decided the question was working with new legislation and lacked the experience which time had given the present
court. Yet Justice Black was joined by Justice Voelker when he stated that a decision
of the same earlier court was entitled to greater weight than intervening opinions overruling it because the earlier court was closer to the legislation. Dyer v. Sears, Roebuck &:
Co., 350 Mich. 92 at 95, 85 N.W. (2d) 152 (1957).
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Iature has adopted the judicial interpretation. It is presumed that
the legislature knew of the interpretation and would have
amended the statute had it disapproved.44 (3) The legislature
enacts a statute, the court interprets it and the legislature subsequently amends the statute. In this situation it is presumed that
the legislature intended some change in the prior interpretation.45
(4) The legislature enacts a statute, the court does not interpret it
and the legislature subsequently amends the statute. In this situation the court feels free to interpret the original statute to have
the same effect as the amended statute. Here the preceding rule
does not apply, there being no interpretation to be affected by the
change; the legislature might have intended merely to clarify the
law.4o
B. Workmen's Comp·ensation. The Workmen's Compensation
Act47 has not only been the most frequently interpreted Michigan
statute in recent years, but it has also received the most comprehensive "treatment."48 As in the area of contributory negligence,
the present majority of the court views its decisions not as changes
hut as a return to earlier correct interpretations of the act. 49
I. Employment. "Arising out of and in the course of employment" has long been treated as a dual standard by Michigan
courts.50 "Arising out of" has been construed to mean that the
employment must be the proximate cause of the injury.51 "In
the course of employment" has been interpreted to relate to the
time, place and circumstances of the injury.52
In changing the Michigan position from perhaps the most

44 Jeruzal

v. Wayne County Drain Commissioner, 350 Mich. 527, 87 N.W. (2d) 122

(1957).
45 See MacDonald v. Quimby, 350 -Mich. 21, 85 N.W. (2d) 157 (1957).
46 Detroit Edison v. Janosz, 350 Mich. 606, 87 N.W. (2d) 126 (1957).
47 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948), chapters 411 to 417, §411.1 et seq., as

modified by
chapter 408, §408.1 et seq.
48 This "treatment" has not been exclusively judicial. The act had been amended
196 times up to 1957. Sheppard v. Michigan Nat. Bank, 348 Mich. 577 at 631, 83 N.W.
(2d) 614 (1957).
49 See Barron v. Detroit, 348 Mich. 213 at 216, 82 N.W. (2d) 463 (1957).
50 Buvia v. Oscar Daniels Co., 203 Mich. 73, 168 N.W. 1009, 7 A.L.R. 1301 (1919);
Thier v. Widdifield, 210 Mich. 355, 178 N.W. 16 (1920); Sichterman v. Kent Storage Co.,
217 Mich. 364, 186 N.W. 498, 20 A.L.R. 309 (1922); Appleford v. Kimmel, 297 -Mich. 8,
296 N.W. 861 (1941).
51 See note 47 supra and Graham v. Sommerville Constr. Co., 336 Mich. 359, 58 N.W.
(2d) 101 (1953).
52 See notes 47 and 48 supra and Mann v. Board of '.Education of Detroit, 266 Mich.
271, 253 N.W. 294 (1934).
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conservative53 to a position of leadership in the movement toward
greater liberality, the present majority has not effected much
change in the formal interpretations given the phrases "arising
out of" and "in the course of" as used in the act. The majority
continues to require a causal relation between the employment
and injury54 although the element of proximate cause seems somewhat diluted.55 Instead of changing the applicable tests, the majority has achieved liberality by broadening interpretation of the
word "employment." It has replaced the earlier "what he was
hired to do" or "control" test56 with a rather complete catalog of
activities at work.51
An incidental effect of this sweeping definition of employment is a rather hazy merging of the dual standard. This merger
is of little significance in the ordinary case because once the
"arising out of" test is satisfied, satisfaction of the "in the course
of" test is nearly automatic. There are two instances, however,
when the distinction between the two tests could be of controlling
importance. One involves the statutory presumption that an
employee is in the course of his employment when arriving at
and leaving his employer's premises.58 The other involves the legislative pre-emption of an employee's common law actions against
his employer for injuries occurring "in the course of ... his employment."59 In both instances "arising out of" was omitted by
the legislature.
2. Accident. The second interpretative difficulty involves the
term "personal injury." In 1914 the court determined that to be
compensable under Part II00 of the act an injury must be accidental, and denied compensation for an occupational disease. 61
In 1937 the legislature enacted Part VII62 providing compensa53 See Pound, "Comments on Recent Important Workmen's Compensation Cases,"
15 NACCA L.J. 45 at 54 (1955).
54 Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303 at 327, 91 N.W. (2d) 493 (1958); Stewart v. Chrysler
Corp., 350 Mich. 596, 87 N.W. (2d) 117 (1957).
55 See Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., 353 Mich. 286, 91 N.W. (2d) 516 (1958).
56 Salmon v. Bagley Laundry Co., 344 Mich. 471, 74 N.W. (2d) 1 (1955); Tegels v.
Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 329 Mich. 84, 44 N.W. (2d) 880 (1950).
57 Salmon v. Bagley Laundry Co., 344 Mich. 471 at 475 (dissent). See also Wheeler
v. Dept. of Conservation, 350 Mich. 590, 87 N.W. (2d) 69 (1957).
58 Mich. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1956) §412.1. But see Dyer v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 350
Mich. 92, 85 N.W. (2d) 152 (1957).
59 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §411.1.
60 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §412.1 et seq.
61Adams v. Acme White Lead&: Color Works, 182 Mich. 157, 148 N.W. 485 (1914).
62 Mich. Public Act No. 61 (1937).
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tion for occupational injuries and diseases. The word "accident"
did not appear in the basic compensating provisions but did appear in other sections and in the title. In 1943 and again in 1952
the legislature amended the act and omitted the terms "accident"
and "accidental" in fifty-two places altogether. 63 The question
presented by this legislative activity was whether or to what extent the accident requirement had been eliminated from the act.
Early cases considering this question display considerable diversity of opinion.64 Contrary to judicial statements that this problem has been finally settled,05 the cases evidence a greater difference of opinion than ever before. Justice Carr requires accidental
cause throughout the act. Justice Edwards would not require
accident of any sort in Part II but has given no opinion as to
Part VII. Chief Justice Dethmers would not require any accident
as to "single-event injuries," those not the result of aggravation of
pre-existing physical defects. Justice Kelly would require only an
accidental result in non-aggravation cases under Part II. Justices
Smith and Black require only accidental result, but require it in
both parts. This is gleaned from two decisions comprised of
twelve opinions signed seventeen times by only seven justices.66
Of the present court, Justices Voelker and Kavanagh did not
participate.
3. Aggression and Horseplay. One employee maliciously or
sportively attacks another. In the ensuing activity one or the other
of them is hurt. Can the injured one recover compensation? The
old rules were fairly clear. In the case of malicious aggression: (a)
the aggressor could not recover because the act specifically bars
compensation for injuries occasioned by the injured employee's
intentional and willful misconduct; 67 (h) the victim to recover
need only show that the assault was .incident to his employment.08

Mich. Public Act No. 245 (1943).
E.g., Hagopian v. Highland Park, 313 Mich. 608, 22 N.W. (2d) 116 (1946): Anderson
v. General Motors Corp., 313 Mich. 630, 22 N.W. (2d) 108 (1946); Kasarewski v. Hupp
Motor Car Corp., 315 Mich. 225, 23 N.W. (2d) 689 (1946); Brazauskis v. Muskegon County
Board of Road Commissioners, 345 Mich. 480, 76 N.W. (2d) 851 (1956).
65 See Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich. 635 at 657, 83 N.W. (2d) 603 (1957).
66Sheppard v. Michigan Nat. Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W. (2d) 614 (1957), a
1-2-2-1-2-1 decision; and Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich. 635, 83- N.W. (2d) 603 (1957), a
1-1-2-1-2-1 decision. See also Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., 353 Mich. 286, 91 N.W.
(2d) 516 (1958).
67 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §412.2; Horvath v. La Fond, 305 Mich. 69, 8 N.W. (2d)
915 (1943).
68 Marshall v. Baker-Vawter Co., 206 Mich. 466, 173 N.W. 191 (1919); Schultz v.
63
64
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In the case of horseplay the injured employee usually could not
recover, whether or not he participated, because the injury did
not arise out of and in the course of the employment.00
The present majority has indicated dissatisfaction with these
rules. In the case of malicious aggression it has stated that the distinction between the aggressor and the victim is difficult, if not
completely unrealistic to make, and has indicated that very limited judicial review will be given administrative findings that the
injured employee was the victim rather than the aggressor. 70 In
deciding a case in which the malicious aggressor question was
clearly not before them, four members of the majority indicated
that they would require something closely akin to premeditation
to bar the aggressor's recovery. 71 The non-aggressor apparently
still must show that the injury was incident to his employment,
but this requirement is probably merely an application of the expanded concept of "employment."72 In the case of horseplay, the
fact of horseplay will no longer bar the non-participant. 73 The
participant also will be allowed recovery where he can show that
the injury arose out of and in the course of employment; again
~is would seem to be an application of "employment" in its
expanded connotation.74
4. Conclusion. The majority has definitely indicated the
general approach it will take in interpreting the workmen's
compensation act. Previous cases had vacillated between two
conflicting maxims of statutory interpretation: statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed; 75 remedial statutes are to be broadly construed. 76 Today there should
be little doubt but that the latter controls. 77
Yet even assuming that by liberalizing interpretation of
Chevrolet Motor Co., 256 Mich. 393, 239 N.W. 894 (1932); Slusher v. Pontiac Fire Dept.,
284 Mich. 657, 280 N.W. 78 (1938).
60 Tarpper v. Weston-Mott Co., 200 Mich. 275, 166 N.W. 857 (1918); Derhammer v.
Detroit News, 229 Mich. 658, 202 N.W. 958 (1925); Jones v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon
Foundry Co., 284 Mich. 358, 279 N.W. 860 (1938).
70 Stewart v. Chrysler Corp., 350 Mich. 596 at 600, 87 N.W. (2d) 117 (1957).
71 Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 91 N.W. (2d) 493 (1958).
72 Note 70 supra.
73 Hollingsworth v. Auto Specialties, 352 Mich. 255 at 265, 89 N.W. (2d) 431 (1958).
74lbid.
75 E.g., Smith v. Wilson Foundry & Machine Co., 296 Mich. 484, 296 N.W. 654 (1941).
76 E.g., Simpson v. Lee & Cady, 294 Mich. 460, 293 N.W. 718 (1940).
77 " .•. [W]e reject . . . [the derogation maxim] without qualification." Sheppard
v. Michigan Nat. Bank, 348 Mich. 577 at 589, 83 N.W. (2d) 614 (1957).
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the act the majority has furthered its overall policy, the manner
in which this has been accomplished leaves something to be desired. Although the opinions clearly apprise counsel of the
majority attitude, they appear to do little to clarify the law.
In place of a "3-2-2 monster" decision, 78 the court now provides "settled" 1-2-2-1-2-1 decisions. 79 • This is more than unsettling to the lawyer, as it would seem to frustrate one of the
basic purposes of the act-prompt settlement of workmen's claims
at a minimum of litigation and expense.80
IV.

Conclusion

Any analysis of the efforts and direction of a court of law
must consider the approach of that court to the application of
the doctrine of stare decisis in formulating its decisions. The
American doctrine of stare decisis is not a rule r_1equiring strict
adherence to precedent, a rule which is broken when a prior
decision is overruled.81 Rather it is a broad principle flexibly
adjusting two needs, the need for stability and the need for
progress in the law. There is no problem of stare decisis if a
court feels the prior decision to be correct. If a court feels the
prior decision to have been wrong it must then consider application of the doctrine of stare decisis by balancing the good and
bad which will result from overruling or following precedent,
a question of social policy. Generally a court will be more likely
to resolve the issue in favor of following precedent where the
area of law is such that reliance has previously been placed upon
the existing rule. Typically this would be true as to the "vested
interests" concepts which exist in property and contract law
and to criminal law. On the other hand, where action has been
taken largely without reference to the existing law, a court may

78 Justice Black so described Beltnick v. Mt. Pleasant State Home &: Training School,
346 Mich. 494, 78 N.W. (2d) 302 (1956), in Sheppard v. Michigan Nat. Bank, 348 Mich.
577 at 579, 83 N.W. (2d) 614 (1957).
79 See note 66 supra.
so See Hill, "Progress in the Field of Workmen's Compensation," 13 DET. B. Q. 8
(1945); LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §2.20 (1952); Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303
at 309, 91 N.W. (2d) 493 (1958).
81 The British doctrine is much more strict and consequently requires an extremely
careful determination of the ratio decidendi of a decision. 17 Mon. L. REv. 462 (1954);
'11 L. Q. REv. 196 (1955).
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be less disposed to follow precedent. 82 This would be the case
in areas of torts and workmen's compensation in which the
Michigan Supreme Court has recently been so active.
There seem to be two basic points in issue between the present majority and minority of the Michigan Supreme Court.
One concerns the soundness of particular rules. The other involves application of stare decisis where a change in the rules
may be desirable. Unfortunately there has been little or no
clarification in the opinions as to which of the two possible disputes a particular case involves. It is notable, however, that the
minority most frequently relies upon Michigan precedents whereas the majority searches more widely for its authority, citing
not only cases from other jurisdictions but also relying heavily
upon treatises and the Restatements.83 From this it might be inferred that the minority relies on the inertia of stare decisis
while the majority asserts the wrongness of the particular rule
in question. It is regrettable that both groups cannot come to
grips with both issues.
The method of analysis employed in decisions by the present
court often touches polar extremes. At times it is very careful
to avoid generalizations. 84 In other instances opinions are directed at a broad but non-decisive issue.85 Opinions of this type are
frequently written by dissenting justices and might be explained
as a matter of judicial advocacy. 86 Nevertheless, considering the
frequency with which such dissents have become law, a more
thorough exposition of the problems involved would seem to
be warranted. The decisions are frequently very long and padded

82 Von Moschzisker, "Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort," 37 HARV. L. REv. 409
(1924). But see Sprecher, "The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the
Extent to Which It Should Be Applied," 31 A.B.A.J. 501 (1945); Douglas, "Stare Decisis,"
49 CoL. L. REv. 735 (1949).
83 See, e.g., Bisceglia v. Cunningham Drugstores, 350 Mich. 159, 85 N.W. (2d) 91
(1957); Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W. (2d) 537 (1957).
84 People v. Stoeckl, 347 Mich. I, 78 N.W. (2d) 640 (1956); People v. McFadden, 347
Mich. 357, 79 N.W. (2d) 869 (1956).
85 See, e.g., Justice Smith's dissent in People v. Robinson, 344 Mich. 353, 74 N.W.
(2d) 41 (1955).
86 Edwards, "Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Smith," 34 UNIV. DET. L.J. 81 at
85-86 (1956); Moorhead, "Concurring and Dissenting Opinions," 38 A.B.A.J. 821 (1952);
Stephens, "Function of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts of Last Resort,"
5 UNIV. FLA. L. REv. 394 (1952); Carter, "Dissenting Opinions," 4 HAsTINGS L.J. 118 (1953);
Musmanno, "Dissenting Opinions," 6 KANs. L. REv. 407 (1958); Musmanno v. Eldredge,
382 Pa. 167, 114 A. (2d) 511 (1955).
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with quotations at length from the record, other cases and texts.87
Often they are criss-crossed by dissenting and concurring opinions. 88 It is of course comforting to the la-wyer to know that
the court has threshed ~:mt the matter and consulted numerous
sources, but opinions of this type are too frequently of little
value to one interested in determining the precise rule of the
case. One might even get the impression from the nature of the
opinions that the present majority may be writing for posterity.
Credit must be given to the readiness of the present majority
to take a fresh look at the law and attempt to shape the ·law in
a given case so that justice will be done. Certainly this should
be the prime goal of any court, and the Michigan Supreme
Court has, in furthering its conceptions of the judicial process,
done much to achieve this objective.

Frederic F. Brace, Jr., S.Ed.
James A. Park

87 Sun Oil Co. v. Seamon, 349 Mich. 387, 84 N.W. (2d) 840 (1957). "It seems to me
that a lawyer or a judge should be able to reach the conclusion that five and five are ten
without expounding the whole science of mathematics." Smith, "Judicial Opinions," 34
M1cH. ST. B. J. 21 at 23 (November 1955). See also King, "The Number and Length of
Judicial Opinions," 33 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 108 (1949).
88 See note 66 supra.

